- guardian.co.uk, Sunday February 17 2002 01.11 GMT
There is now a striking difference in atmosphere on the two sides of the Atlantic, which could easily degenerate into a major confrontation in the months ahead. The dominant mood in Washington is one of restrained triumphalism. Military unilateralism, many are keen to point out, has worked. The sceptics' dire predictions turned out to be mistaken. America was not sucked into a long and inconclusive military campaign in Afghanistan. The proverbial "Arab street" has, so far at least, not exploded. And with Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan probably has its most enlightened ruler for decades. Osama bin Laden may be missing, but the speed at which America has achieved most of its objectives has whetted the appetite for more. Hawks such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz have the upper hand within the administration. Colin Powell, hero of all European governments, looks isolated.
George Bush's "axis of evil" State of the Union address came packaged with a de facto "war budget" to Congress, allocating a further $48bn in defence spending in case the original $330 billion did not inspire enough awe. If implemented, the Bush proposals will mean US defence spending will be greater than the total defence budgets (in 2000) of the next 15 countries combined, 13 of which are declared allies of the US.
By contrast, European diplomats and politicians feel rising irritation. Even among America's most loyal allies in London there is disappointment, even frustration, at the persistently unilateral character of most US foreign policy decisions. Europeans repeat to each other the long list of US "opt-outs" from international agreements - the Kyoto Protocol, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Landmine Treaty, UN convention on small arms, and the International Criminal Court. Despite European hopes, September 11th did not lead to a rethink of these decisions. Instead, the United States has added a few more.
Despite all the talk about the need to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Washington has walked away from the Enforcement Protocol of the Bio-Weapons Convention. Bush also withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - even after Moscow signalled that it was ready to discuss amendments which would enable the US to develop and test a missile defence system. A "casual" approach to the Geneva Convention and the manner in which the American executive branch, not an independent court, decided that none of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay would get POW status also upset Europeans.
So Europeans decided that the "axis of evil" speech demanded a firm reaction. In quick succession, various European leaders - representing the full range of national and ideological backgrounds - expressed their concerns. Hubert Vedrine, French foreign minister, condemned Bush's speech as "simplistic" and "absurd". Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, warned against "global unilateralism". European Commissioner Chris Patten, not known to shoot from the hip, urged European governments to speak up before Washington "goes into unilateralist overdrive". For all of this diplomatic excitement in Europe, the Americans have shown little concern - instead stepping up plans to attack Iraq, on their own, if necessary.
The transatlantic relationship is bound to get worse unless leaders take a number of concrete steps. But the Europeans must realise that simply complaining will not shift American thinking. Europe needs to focus on getting its own act together if it expects its views to be taken seriously. European leaders routinely pledge their support for a Union able to assert itself more strongly on the global stage. But progress towards a credible EU foreign policy has been slow and uneven.
If the EU is to be able to act effectively, it needs to change the way it deals with foreign policy. EU foreign policy is driven from two centres of power, led by Chris Patten and Javier Solana respectively. This split between "money" and "policies" hinders the EU's ability to influence world events. The EU needs to move towards merging these roles so that a single EU foreign policy supremo promotes EU interests around the world.
The EU should also abolish the disruptive six-monthly rotating presidency, with Javier Solana and his officials taking over the tasks of representing the EU externally, and providing impetus to the EU foreign policy agenda. And effectiveness will require more resources. Tripling Solana's budget (to 120 million Euros) may sound ambitious, but it would simply stop Solana having to beg the member-states to give him the money to do what they have already asked him to. Solana has a pitiful number of officials - just 26 - in his policy unit. The target should be more like 500: this could be achieved through both direct recruitment and by stationing more national diplomats there on short-term contracts.
A change of mindset is also necessary. Many Europeans are fond of saying that the EU is a unique international actor with an extraordinarily wide range of instruments. This is true in principle, but has not happened in practice. For too long the EU has behaved like the World Bank: it is seen as a place where people simply hand out money. A proper foreign policy strategy will require the EU to learn how to use the full range of instruments at its disposal - such as trade policy, financial and technical assistance plus immigration rules - as part of a clear political strategy.
If Europe undertakes serious reforms, it is more likely to have its voice taken seriously in Washington. That would enable European leaders to demonstrate more effectively that global norms and multilateral governance will not go away as European preoccupations, but that a robust multilateralism will become more important in facing new political, economic and security challenges. Those Americans who want to set up a global partnership with Europe should accept that the promotion of a rule-based international system must be an explicit aim of it.
If the transatlantic relationship is to be renewed, both sides need to be prepared - financially and politically - to use the full spectrum of foreign policy tools. That would mean a rethink in America's financial priorities, reversing the trend towards spending ever more money on the military but ever less on diplomacy. These budgetary decisions have real policy consequences - if the only instrument you have is a hammer, all your problems start looking like a nail. While the Europeans, slowly and insufficiently, try to beef up their "hard security", the US is making false economies in stalling or reducing its "soft security" programmes.
While all of these steps could renew the transatlantic relationship, there are major tensions ahead if the US decides that it is ready to wage a substantial military campaign, for instance against Iraq, on its own. The administration's key figures, right up to President Bush, have stressed that they must be ready, if necessary, to go it alone. But they should ponder the track record of US military campaigns in the past 100 years: whenever the US has fought wars alongside other countries and for a goal that had widespread support, as it did in WWI, WWII and the Gulf, the results have been an overwhelming success - both militarily and morally. When the US has fought wars largely alone and without significant international backing, as it did in Vietnam, the outcome has been a disaster.
Steven Everts is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform. His new report "Shaping a credible EU foreign policy" will be launched by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, and Carl Bildt, former Swedish Prime Minister, this week.
