- guardian.co.uk, Sunday June 23 2002 00.55 BST
Denmark itself will be in and out of the European Union Presidency at the same time, when it takes over from July 1st. The country's complex system of treaty exemptions - the so-called opt-outs - means that Greece will be presiding over crucial issues including defence and monetary policy.
Danish ministers will head negotiations in other crucial policy areas where Denmark has chosen to stay outside certain provisions. Politicians, notably those in Pia Kjaersgaard's Danish People's Party - have captured international headlines with moves to tighten national asylum and immigration legislation. Yet the the opt-out on justice and home affairs means that, even though the Danish government has done much to set the EU agenda in this high-profile policy area, it will not necessarily be implementing legislation adopted under its supervision.
Perhaps this dual role will prepare Denmark for tackling the EU's key preoccupations, inclusion and exclusion. The Danish Presidency will focus attention on restricting access to EU territory. At the same time, the Danes also hope to chair the final stages of negotiations for enlargement, bringing an unprecedented intake of new EU citizens. Denmark is an ardent supporter of an extension of the Union at the same time as it is keen to keep third-party nationals out.
It was the previous Danish Presidency in 1993 which set "the Copenhagen criteria" - the political and economic conditions for EU membership. The Danish government now hopes to see the process come full circle at the Copenhagen summit in December, with agreement on accession for ten new members - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, the three Baltic states, plus Malta and Cyprus.
All existing member states agree that enlargement is a dominant issue. In particular, the addition of central and eastern European countries would bring a symbolic - and belated - close to the continent's Cold War divisions. Yet, the realities of bread-and-butter politics threaten to overshadow the lofty rhetoric of a united Europe.
Passing the buck
Enlargement hinges on three conditions: conclusion of negotiations with candidate countries, the establishment of a financial framework, and Union-wide ratification of a new treaty to improve the functioning of the European institutions. None of these has yet been met, although progress is being made on the first.
Financial transfers to new members through the Structural Funds, the EU's main tool for regional development, and the Common Agricultural Policy have, as expected, proved to be serious stumbling blocks. Most member states have rejected the European Commission (EC)'s proposals for phasing ten new states into these programmes.
The sticking point is not the amounts involved, but rather the suggestion to extend direct payments, also called 'compensatory payments', to farmers in the new member states. Existing members are concerned that it will prove difficult to reduce, or abolish, these payments at future budget negotiations once the candidate countries have become full partners.
The widely publicised dispute between old and new members, however, obscures significant differences of opinion among current members. Net contributors to the EU budget refuse to bear the brunt of enlargement expenses. Net beneficiaries, on the other hand, argue that relatively poorer areas should not be disproportionately affected by enlargement.
In other words, the haves do not want to pay more, and the relative have-nots are unwilling to give up any of the benefits of membership to the absolute have-nots who wish to join. Thus, new member states would stay, at least partly, excluded from some of the programmes that made them want to be included in the EU in the first place.
Despite difficulties in finding an acceptable distribution of budgetary costs, observers believe that core member states have invested so much political prestige in enlargement that they will eventually reach the necessary compromises. So the real test of the EU's enlargement resolve is likely to take place elsewhere, and finding solutions will take equal amounts of diplomatic flexibility and communication skills.
The prospect of including a divided Cyprus, for example, continues to make EU diplomats uneasy. Although the official line is that reunification of the island is not a prerequisite for membership, efforts to break the deadlock have been intensified.
But the most concrete obstacle to early enlargement is often ignored. This is because it involves the always unpredictable factor of public opinion, and therefore, is the most difficult to overcome.
In June last year, the Irish voted in a referendum to reject the Nice Treaty, the EU's blueprint for reforms necessitated by enlargement. Without Irish ratification, the enlargement process could grind to a halt. Moves to find a response were put on hold, pending the re-election of Prime Minister Bertie Ahern in May. Ahern has promised a new referendum to pave the way for extending the EU. But, like the date, it is has yet to be determined what it is that the Irish voters will actually be asked to decide.
The Danes appear ideally suited to preside over efforts to find a solution acceptable to EU partners and the Irish public alike. After the Danish 'no' to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the then Danish leadership negotiated the present opt-outs to secure a positive vote in 1993. The task is, however, more complicated this time. Now member states' priorities and sensitivities must also be balanced against those of the applicants - although candidate countries are not given the option of negotiating general exemptions from existing EU rules and regulations in their accession preparations.
Since the final decision on membership will be taken by popular consultation in the respective countries, significant concessions to Ireland could impact negatively on public support in the candidate countries, possibly prompting a rejection of the accession treaty. Those currently excluded might decide that they do not want to be included after all.
Inclusion and exclusion
The Irish vote was, to a large extent, a reaction to domestic political grievances. But it did bring home the well-known discrepancy between the visions of the political elite and the wishes of the public. Enlargement is no exception to this.
Recent figures from the EC's statistical survey, Eurobarometer, show that just twenty-one percent think that the EU should be enlarged to include all countries wishing to join. Only one percent of respondents feel well informed about enlargement. The elite's focus on the historic opportunities of enlargement has clearly failed to capture the imagination of the electorate.
As the rapid rise of the far right across Europe confirms, the European public worries more about the numbers and origins of asylum seekers and immigrants than it does about enlargement. Exclusion takes precedence over inclusion. Moreover, the far right's anti-immigration ticket is often coupled with Euroscepticism. Enlargement could strengthen this trend. The integration of new member states unfamiliar to many EU citizens might reinforce the desire to keep others out.
In which case, the welcoming of millions of new EU citizens will be accompanied by even more determined efforts to control numbers of non-EU nationals more effectively. In addition to setting common standards for the reception of asylum seekers, this will also involve a renewed focus on integrating immigration and foreign policy. In particular, the Danish presidency will seek to encourage colleagues to use development funds more actively to reward countries that cooperate on curbing migration. Yet in keeping with the EU's inclusion and exclusion logic, enlargement could provide the impetus for an agreement on common asylum and immigration policies that has so far proved elusive.
The Danish presidency plans to head up the most wide-reaching transformation of the EU in the history of the Community. But the enlargement process has clearly demonstrated that core tensions remain unchanged. The question of who should be included and excluded from the Union is as pertinent - and as difficult to resolve - as ever. The success of Denmark's leadership will be determined by its ability to strike a careful balance.
· Charlotte Lindberg Warakaulle is Speech Writer at the Director-General of the United Nations Office in Geneva. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect formal UN positions.
About The World Today essay
This article will appear in the July 2002 issue of The World Today, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House. An essay from The World Today appears online in Observer Worldview each month.
The World Today provides expert analysis on current international issues. For more information and an online sample issue of The World Today, please go to www.theworldtoday.org. Please contact Sarah Crozier at scrozier@riia.org if you would like more information.
