- guardian.co.uk, Sunday March 2 2003 00.10 GMT
Neo-conservative voices in the United States have been calling for regime change in Baghdad as the first step in a grand scheme to re-order the Middle East. Their rationale for how this will tackle the causes of terrorism rests on the assumption that these derive from corrupt regimes and Islamist extremism. While they are about it, they blame their European allies for compounding the problem by pursuing material self-interest in places like Iraq and Iran, and seemingly excusing the behaviour of some terrorists, notably Palestinian ones, on the grounds of provocation.
Having long decried the leaderships of Iraq and Iran, the neo-conservatives are now demanding reform of the political systems in Saudi Arabia and a string of other Arab countries too. Their plan is to 'liberate' the Iraqis, make common cause with the Iranian people against conservative clerics, demand that the Saudis overhaul their religious education system and restructure state finances, and call on all the other Arab leaders to embrace democracy.
Given the disdain of the neo-conservatives for the United Nations, it is no surprise that their arguments have not been raised in the Security Council. However, they may make life difficult for their more pragmatic Washington colleagues if they do not get their way.
Contending positions
The nub of the US pragmatists' position is that the Iraqi leadership has developed and used chemical and biological weapons and might do so again, or make them available to non-state actors who will. In effect, the US administration is calling for a preemptive war to remove a potential danger. The case put forcefully to the Security Council by Secretary of State Colin Powell is that Iraqi subterfuge is making a mockery of UN authority and the Council needs to contemplate 'serious consequences'.
Powell's position was somewhat undermined, however, by chief weapons inspector Dr Hans Blix in his February 14 report. His team cannot substantiate US claims that Iraqis are spying on them and clearing sites of incriminating evidence ahead of inspections. Indeed, Blix's account of improvements in the level of Iraqi cooperation was sufficient for the French to contend that the process was working well enough to warrant giving it more time.
In his eloquent and moving presentation to the Security Council, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin raised an additional argument. From the vantage point of an 'old country', he said, France can attest that the humanitarian costs of war, and the danger to regional stability, are too grave to risk if a peaceful way can be found to hold Iraq to its obligations under UN resolution 1441. The drawback in this position, as the French acknowledge, is that the Iraqis have cooperated so far only because of the threat of war.
The British case, previously focused on the weapons issue, has also taken on a new dimension. Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking on the same day as the mass demonstrations against war in London and around the world, argued passionately that the costs for the Iraqi people of leaving President Saddam Hussein in place should also be weighed in the balance. There will be more agony for them in lives ost, malnutrition, political repression and torture if the status quo persists. While conceding that the legal case for war must rest on the issue of Iraqi non-compliance with UN resolutions, Blair has taken a stance reminiscent of his quest to save the Kosovan and Afghan people from oppression and death.
On the face of it, there is no reconciling the US, French and British arguments. The Powell line calls for action in the face of Iraqi subterfuge, but has yet to convince the anti-war camp that the evidence is sufficient to justify force. For de Villepin, the risks and costs of war outweigh the danger posed by Iraq, and certainly are not warranted so long as inspections are making progress. For Blair, however, war would mean regime change which, even though there would be loss of lives, would at least prevent more suffering under the current government.
A complicating factor is that none of these positions can stand alone. As the French concede, successful inspections require the very real threat of war mounted by the United States. Take that away and Iraq is off the hook. On their side, the Americans cannot call for action in the name of upholding UN authority and resolutions if the majority of the Security Council deny them the go-ahead. The British, meanwhile, cannot deliver a better future for the Iraqis on the back of a US assault alone.
Coup plot
The seriousness of this last contention was born out by reports from members of the Iraqi opposition, preparing to meet in Iraqi Kurdistan in mid-February, that they had been informed by US officials that there would be no role for them in a post-war administration after all. Instead, apparently, the US plan is to put its own military in charge of running the country post-Saddam. It would work in partnership with the existing Iraqi bureaucracy and military establishment.
This message could be intended to win the support of senior figures for regime change in the Iraqi Ba'ath party and armed forces. The hope, perhaps, is that they would take out Saddam themselves and then do a disarmament deal with the Americans.
Legally speaking, however, such a deal can only be done with the UN Security Council, through completion of the inspection regime. If this could be arranged, the Council would presumably breath a sigh of relief and transatlantic rifts could heal. Blair might feel rather chagrined that his call for liberation of the Iraqi people had gone by the board, but he would not have to face the domestic political costs of war without UN backing.
The losers in this situation would be the Iraqi opposition groups, not least the Kurds, who would presumably no longer benefit from their US-protected autonomy once Washington was on good terms with Baghdad. The Shi'a majority could also lose hope of better political representation, and the fate of the Shi'a Iraqi opposition based in Iran would be an issue.
Also outmanoeuvred would be the more ideological voices in the US administration who have been the most enthusiastic patrons of the Iraqi opposition. Denied their chance of remaking the region in the name of democracy and American values, the neo-conservatives could possibly look to President George Bush himself, who has reportedly accepted their argument, to keep to the more expansive vision.
Unilateralism will not work
Pressure from all these quarters could undermine the prospects of coup leaders in Iraq and lead to a series of counter-coups. Failing a coup d'etat in the first place, if an American invasion went all the way to Baghdad and set up a US military administration in partnership with the existing Iraqi establishment, the same pressures from Washington and disaffected Iraqis, including Kurds, would apply.
Pragmatists in the US administration need to weigh the benefits of going it alone, without the encumbrance of UN allies or Iraqi opposition groups, against the costs of increased anti-Americanism among their allies and across the Middle East - if they flout international law, try to run Iraq by military fiat and presumably take a hand in energy development. They also need to calculate how they are going to cater and pay for the huge humanitarian consequences of war without UN assistance.
Iraq cannot be dealt with in isolation from the wider region. Under attack, refugees are expected to flood to the borders. The sight of Iraqis under US assault will exacerbate anti-Americanism in other Arab and Muslim communities. The so-called 'Arab street' may not rise up, but there could easily be more recruits for Al Qaeda. The economies of Turkey, Syria and Jordan are all dependent on the legal or illegal flow of oil from Iraq. The fate of Iraqi Kurds will affect the aspirations of fellow Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Syria, and the interests of Turkey, if not the others, will have to be factored in. Whatever the outcome for the Iraqi Shi'a, there will be repercussions in Iran.
Square the circle
The way forward now could be for the French to oblige Powell with a detailed examination of what 'serious consequences' could actually mean. They could engage the US administration on its war plans and challenge it to explain how it intends to limit civilian casualties, provide emergency food and health care, and justify US military rule the day after. In return, the French could be challenged to explain how they expect to keep pressure on Baghdad to complete inspections and disarmament.
The task of the British, and one dear to the heart of Blair, could be to try once more to extract a clearer undertaking from Washington to do something concrete about resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such an effort would presumably still have the backing of the Jordanian, Egyptian and Saudi governments and the endorsement of the Arab League. With this, the US international image could improve immensely. The obstacle, however, would likely be the neo-conservatives in Washington.
To outflank the US ideologues on their own terms, and reconcile all the positions in the Security Council, a vision could be articulated for Iraqi and regional development and conflict resolution after the crisis. The Iraqi regime could even be told that more than just disarmament with UN help is required. Political reform is also needed, and the UN and Washington could help if Baghdad would produce its own peaceful, internal 'regime change'.
This may sound like a chimera, but serious engagement between all the key parties involved in handling the crisis, which is threatening international legality, the western alliance and Middle East stability as well as the future of Iraq, could open more options. The alternative is unilateral US action for regime change, which will result in all the hostility and costs that every imperial adventure has encountered through history, if not worse, in this age of transnational terrorism.
Dr Rosemary Hollis is Head of the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House.
About The World Today essay
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